British laws protecting Indian religious customs and punishing desecration
Around the World in Eighty DaysThe British laws protecting Indian religious customs and punishing desecration function in the story as both a protection for religious sites and a source of legal liability for outsiders. Their force becomes concrete when a visit to the Pagoda of Malabar Hill in Bombay leads to charges against Phileas Fogg and Passepartout, and then to imprisonment and fines. At the same time, a conversation about a widow’s fate in Bundelcund marks the limits of British authority: the law’s protection is not portrayed as extending uniformly across India.
Principle and Territorial Scope
The account frames the rule as a stern obligation to respect the religious practices of Indian communities. Before the temple incident, the narrative notes that British policy punishes disregard for native religious practices. In court, the judge describes the law as protecting the religions of the Indian people equally and strictly. Together, these statements present religious protection not merely as advice to visitors but as a standard that can be enforced through punishment.
That standard appears alongside a divided political map. The British Crown governs a large part of India, but some territories remain outside its authority. When Phileas Fogg asks why the English have not stopped a widow-immolation practice in Bundelcund, Sir Francis Cromarty explains that the district is among the territories over which the British have no power. The contrast defines the rule’s jurisdictional boundary: the narrative presents strong legal protection where British authority operates, but not a power to impose that protection throughout the subcontinent.
The two situations are distinct in the story. The account of the widow’s plight concerns Bundelcund and the limits of colonial jurisdiction; the later prosecution concerns a temple in Bombay. The court does not try Fogg and Passepartout over the events in Bundelcund. Instead, a misunderstanding during the hearing brings the two matters close together, and the judge specifies that the case concerns Malabar Hill in Bombay. This clarification makes both the reach and the limits of the rule legible.
From Temple Visit to Complaint
The legal conflict begins with Passepartout entering the Pagoda of Malabar Hill without knowing that visitors who are Christians are forbidden to enter certain Indian temples, or that worshippers must remove their shoes before entering. He goes inside as a tourist. The resulting encounter with the temple’s priests ends with Passepartout leaving hurriedly, without his shoes and without a package of new clothes and shoes. The episode turns an uninformed visit into an incident with both religious and practical consequences.
The significance of the lost shoes becomes clear later in court. Three Indian priests appear as complainants, and the clerk reads a charge accusing Phileas Fogg and Passepartout of violating a place consecrated by the Brahmin religion. When Passepartout mistakenly connects the priests with the young woman in Bundelcund, the judge corrects him: the proceeding concerns the Bombay temple, not the Pagoda of Pillaji. The clerk then presents the shoes as evidence linking the accused to the earlier visit.
This sequence shows how the rule enters the legal process. A breach associated with a particular place is recast as a formal accusation; the complainants appear before a judge, the charge is read aloud, and a physical object supports the identification of the visit. The court treats the temple’s consecrated status as central to the case, rather than as a matter that a traveller’s ignorance can simply erase.
Judgment and Responsibility
Phileas Fogg admits the facts before the judge, and the court finds Passepartout liable for violating the pagoda on 20 October. The sentence is fifteen days’ imprisonment and a fine of three hundred pounds. The ruling gives the protection described in general terms a specific punitive form: both imprisonment and a substantial financial penalty attach to the offense.
The judge also holds Fogg responsible as Passepartout’s employer. The court says that it has not been proved that the act occurred with the master’s connivance, but considers the master responsible in any case for the conduct of his paid servant. Fogg is sentenced to a week in prison and a fine of one hundred and fifty pounds. The case therefore extends beyond the person who entered the temple: the judgment makes the employer answerable for an employee’s act, even without proof that he authorized it.
The consequences threaten Fogg’s journey as well as his finances. Fix, watching the hearing, recognizes that a week’s detention could give time for the arrest warrant to arrive. Passepartout, meanwhile, understands the sentence as endangering Fogg’s wager. Fogg remains composed and offers bail as the sentence is pronounced. These reactions show that the legal penalty is not an isolated matter: its timing may affect the travellers’ movement, while the rule itself remains the court’s basis for imposing liability.
Significance in the Story
The episode places legal protection and colonial jurisdiction in the same frame without treating them as interchangeable. The court’s action in Bombay demonstrates that the protection of a religious site can be enforced against foreign visitors; the discussion of Bundelcund shows that British officials do not control every territory or practice encountered by the travellers. The story thus gives the rule a definite local force while acknowledging the political limits on its reach.
The prosecution also reverses the travellers’ position. In Bombay, Passepartout’s lack of knowledge does not prevent punishment, and Fogg’s responsibility as employer makes him vulnerable to a penalty arising from his servant’s conduct. The lost shoes, first a consequence of the hurried departure from the temple, return as courtroom evidence. Through that concrete reversal, the narrative connects everyday travel, religious respect, and judicial authority: a brief detour becomes a charge that can detain the party and imperil its schedule.


